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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE
BURGER COURT: VICTIMS' RIGHTS
AND A NEW MODEL OF CRIMINAL
REVIEW
TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL*
On the final day of the 1982 Term, the United States Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Michigan v. Long.' Although primarily a
fourth amendment decision,2 Long's true significance lies in its establish-
ment of a new test for determining when a state decision rests on in-
dependent and adequate state grounds, thus precluding federal review.
The Court held that when such a decision either appears to rest on or be
"interwoven" with federal law, and when the independence or ade-
quacy of a state ground is not clear from the opinion, the Court will
presume that the federal grounds were primarily relied upon.3 This new
test undoubtedly will increase the number of prosecution appeals from
state court criminal decisions that the Supreme Court will review. Con-
sequently, it is important to ask why this Court, which has continually
bemoaned its swollen docket, 4 would voluntarily seek to expand the
number of cases available for its review.
The most intriguing portion of the Long case was the dissent filed by
Justice Stevens.? Repeating a theme he had sounded in previous opin-
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. J.D., University of Michi-
gan, 1975; A.B., Harvard University, 1972.
The author wishes to acknowledge several helpful comments on an earlier draft made by
Professor Michael G. Heyman, and the invaluable research assistance of James B. Ford.
1 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
2 Id. The Court expanded the scope of a Teny search, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
in holding that a police officer may conduct a limited protective search of a suspect's vehicle
as well as the suspect's person. The vehicle search must be based upon a reasonable belief
that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate access to a weapon. The scope of the
search is limited to the areas of the vehicle that may conceal a readily accessible weapon. 103
S. Ct. at 3480.
3 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
4 See Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230 (1983);
Burger, Rxfor an Overburdened Supreme Court: Is Relief in Sight?, 66 JUDICATURE 394, 407 (1983).
5 103 S. Ct. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ions during the Term,6 Justice Stevens questioned the Court's interest in
reviewing state criminal cases in which the defendant had prevailed be-
low. Reasoning that the task of the Supreme Court is to vindicate an
individual's federal constitutional rights, Justice Stevens argued that the
Court should have no interest in reviewing cases in which state courts
have merely "overprotected" a criminal defendant. 7 Perhaps inadver-
tently, Justice Stevens highlighted a nascent trend in Supreme Court
jurisprudence that deserves close attention.
Traditionally, Supreme Court review of criminal cases has pro-
ceeded on two levels. On one level, of course, the Court is determining
whether the rights of the particular defendant in the case at bar were
violated. On a higher level, however, the Court selects such cases for the
purpose of fine-tuning the rights of all citizens versus the machinery of
government. By the time his case reached the Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, Ernesto Miranda ceased being a small-time hoodlum and in-
stead functioned as a representative for each and every American
citizen.8 The rights Miranda was found to possess were rights all citi-
zens thus possessed against the government.
A new model appears to be replacing the traditional "citizens ver-
sus government" model of criminal appellate review in the Supreme
Court. Instead of viewing the criminal case as a tension merely between
the government and the citizen/defendant, the Court now appears to
recognize a separate tension between what it perceives as two discrete
classes of citizens who have conflicting interests. Throughout several
criminal decisions of the 1982 Term, the Court seems to have viewed the
criminal case as an opportunity to adjudicate the respective constitu-
tional rights of the law-abiding ("good citizens") and the criminals
("bad citizens"). The Court perceives this tension, moreover, as a zero-
sum game: gains in rights for the "criminal class" result in losses for the
law-abiding. Arguably linked to the growing interest both in "victims'
rights" and the "rights" of law-abiding citizens in general,9 this new
"good citizen/bad citizen" dichotomy has had a profound effect on the
types of criminal cases the Court has recently accepted for review. 10 A
still more significant change is the Court's apparent use of this dichot-
omy to decide which criminal defendants will have their rights vindi-
cated and which defendants will not. As will be demonstrated, the
6 See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3668 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); South
Dakota v.- Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 924 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 103 S. Ct. at 3490.
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established the now-famous "Miranda warn-
ings" that the police must provide to an individual prior to any custodial interrogation.
9 See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court during its 1982 Term was most protective of defendants
who were in positions in which the "good citizens" of the law-abiding
middle class might conceivably find themselves; conversely, it consist-
ently ruled against prisoners, indigents, the insane, and other members
of the "criminal class."
This Article will analyze the Court's new interest in protecting
"good citizens" by first examining the traditional model, in which the
Supreme Court viewed a criminal case as a conflict solely between the
government and the citizen/defendant. Next, it discusses the rise of
"victims' rights" organizations which have challenged the old premise
that third parties have no "standing" in a criminal case. I suggest that
this spirit has helped create a new model for analyzing criminal cases.
This new model questions whether expanding the rights of a citi-
zen/defendant in a particular case should always be viewed as a victory
for citizens as a whole against government; to the contrary, according to
the new model, such a decision often redounds to the benefit of "bad
citizens" and works to the detriment of "good citizens." Finally, the Ar-
ticle examines how this interest in the rights of "good citizens" has af-
fected not only the kinds of criminal cases the Court is accepting for
review, but the actual disposition of the cases as well.
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
A criminal case pits the machinery of government against the indi-
vidual citizen/defendant. The "traditional model," as I refer to it, is a
system of review in which the rights of citizens in general are developed
through a series of confrontations between the government and specific
citizen/defendants. When the reviewing court determines the rights of
the defendant in the case at bar, it is indirectly defining the rights of
citizens in general. Thus, when the Supreme Court granted Ernesto Mi-
randa's petition for certiorari, the narrow question facing the Court was
whether any of Miranda's federal constitutional rights had been vio-
lated. The Court's eventual decision in Miranda v. Arizona not only de-
cided Ernesto Miranda's case, but also further refined the great balance
between the rights of all citizens and the powers of government. This
idea that the rights of citizens as a whole are often honed through dis-
putes between the government and the most unsavory of the citizenry
was eloquently described by Justice Frankfurter, who noted:
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty
have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice peo-
ple. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we
must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes
TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL
expressed by the Fourth Amendment.1
The "traditional model" is also rooted in established concepts of
federalism. According to this model, the only rights that the United
States Supreme Court can vindicate in a state criminal prosecution are
the federal rights of a particular criminal defendant. Justice Stevens,
dissenting in Michigan v. Long, summarized this aspect of the "traditional
model" when he questioned what interest the Supreme Court could
have in a case in which a state court had acquitted the state defendant
charged with possession of drugs:
In this case the State of Michigan has arrested one of its citizens and
the Michigan Supreme Court has decided to turn him loose. The respon-
dent is a United States citizen as well as a Michigan citizen, but since there
is no claim that he has been mistreated by the State of Michigan, the final
outcome of the state processes offended no federal interest whatever.
Michigan simply provided greater protection to one of its citizens than
some other State might provide or, indeed, than this Court might require
throughout the country.' 2
Justice Stevens did not suggest that any other group of citizens
could have had an interest in the outcome of the case. Nowhere did he
intimate, for example, that the law-abiding citizens of Michigan might
have an interest in seeing that both state and federal drug laws are en-
forced. In fact, consider Justice Stevens' analogy of this case to that of a
United States citizen abroad:
[Cases such as this] should not be of inherent concern to this Court.
The reason may be illuminated by assuming that the events underlying
this case had arisen in another country, perhaps the Republic of Finland.
If the Finnish police had arrested a Finnish citizen for possession of mari-
juana, and the Finnish courts had turned him loose, no American wouldhave
standing to object. If instead they had arrested an American citizen and ac-
quitted him, we might have been concerned about the arrest but we surely
could not have complained about the acquittal, even if the Finnish Court
had based its decision on its understanding of the United States Constitu-
tion. That would be true even if we had a treaty with Finland requiring it
to respect the rights of American citizens under the United States Consti-
tution. We would only be motivated to intervene if an American citizen
were unfairly arrested, tried, and convicted by the foreign tribunal.' 3
Note the presumptions made. Justice Stevens posits that the United
States Supreme Court's only interest is whether Citizen Long's rights
have been violated. Thus, the argument goes, the Court has absolutely
no interest in whether the law-abiding United States citizens of Michi-
gan believed that the Michigan Supreme Court had violated their inter-
est in strict enforcement of drug laws. Justice Stevens intimates that a
11 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12 103 S. Ct. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
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petition from those citizens expressing such an interest would be ac-
corded the same respect that the Court would extend to a petition from
citizens of a foreign country. It is an analogy at which law-abiding
Michigan citizens might well take offense.
Yet Justice Stevens was by no means incorrect in his characteriza-
tion of either the federal system or the Court's traditional role in crimi-
nal cases. Indeed, the Justice may have been guilty of an
understatement when he wrote that if the Finnish police had arrested a
Finnish citizen for a drug violation and the Finnish court had released
him, no American would have standing to object.I4 Indeed, if the FBI
arrests an American citizen for a crime and the federal courts turn him
loose, no American citizen other than the defendant has standing to
object.
The lack of third-party standing in criminal cases was emphasized
by the Supreme Court in Linda R.S. v. Richard 2.5 In that case, the
mother of an illegitimate child brought a class action seeking to enjoin
the local district attorney from prosecuting nonsupport cases only
against the fathers of legitimate children. In holding for the district at-
torney, 16 the majority opinion noted:
The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks
standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he him-
self is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. . . . [I]n Amer-
ican jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. 17
The ordinary law-abiding citizen, whether an actual victim of a crime
or a member of the community at large, is given no role in traditional
American criminal prosecutions. The criminal prosecution is solely a
matter between the state and the criminal defendant.' 8
Two distinct forces have combined to produce the state of affairs
described in Linda R.S The first was the trend in common law from
14 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
16 Id at 619. Because the statute in question created a criminal penalty rather than a civil
remedy, the Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to compel the prosecutor to
act. See id at 618; see also infra text accompanying note 20. But cf. Goldstein, Defining the Role
of the Victim in CrminalProsecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 550-54 (1982) (criticism of Linda AS8. on
the ground that some types of government prosecutions properly warrant citizen
participation).
17 410 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted). See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971);
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961).
18 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See generaly Goldstein, supra note 16, at 518-
20; Hall, Intere/ations of Criminal Law and Torts (pts. I & II), 43 COLUM. L. REv. 753 (1943), 43
COLUM. L. REv. 967 (1943); Note, Private Prosecution-The EntrenchedAnomaly, 50 N.C.L. REv.
1171 (1972); Annot., 66 A.L.R.3D 732 (1975).
TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL [Vol. 75
private to public prosecution. 19 The second force is reflected in the very
character of both our state and federal constitutions. These documents
essentially prohibit the government from interfering with citizens; they
rarely require that government promote positive goals.20 This idea has
been brought sharply into focus with the recent proliferation of suits
initiated by crime victims against the state and its agents alleging mal-
feasance in allowing a dangerous individual under state control to re-
turn to society and harm the plaintiff.2' Plaintiffs have had litle success
in these suits, for reasons most starkly stated in Bowers v. DeVito.2 2 In
that case, the estate of a murdered young woman brought suit against
the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabili-
ties. The woman's assailant had been committed to the department af-
ter being found not guilty by reason of insanity of the murder of another
young woman. One year after his release, the man killed Ms. Bowers.
Her estate charged the department with knowledge of the assailant's
dangerousness and with recklessness in placing him back into the
community.
In holding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,23 Judge Posner, speaking for the Seventh Circuit,
announced:
[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against
being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails
to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the
19 See supra note 18 and authorities cited therein. For an interesting historical perspective
of the movement in England towards public prosecution of crimes, see Langbein, Shaping the
Eighteenth-Centugy Crminal Trial" A Viewfirom the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Cii. L. REv. 1, 55-84
(1983).
20 See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Bowers, see infra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text. See also Doe v. South Fla. State Hosp., 549 F. Supp. 838,
840-41 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (following Bowers). But see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW § 5-22 (1978) (contending that local governments must provide citizens with
certain services).
21 See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616
(7th Cir. 1982); Doe v. South Fla. State Hosp., 549 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Doyle v.
United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Cf Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (imposing limited duty on therapists to
warn forseeable victims of threats posed by dangerous patients, but recognizing immunity of
government therapists and police for certain decisions as to whether to confine an individual).
22 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress ap-
plicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
1984] THE BURGER COURT AND CRIMINAL REVIEW 369
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any
other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of nega-
tive liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the
federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a
service as maintaining law and order.24
Faced with this response from the courts, it is not surprising that
America is currently witnessing the rise of a popular movement that
proclaims that victims of crimes-and law-abiding citizens in general-
do indeed have "rights" under the criminal law.
II. THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Historically, victims of crimes have had very few rights or remedies.
Since the early eighteenth century, when crimes began to be viewed as
wrongs against the state, government officials have maintained almost
absolute control over criminal proceedings against alleged perpetra-
tors.25 Victims' roles in the process became increasingly ill-defined, re-
sulting in victims' alienation from criminal prosecutions. As witnesses
for the state, the victims often were left ignored and uninformed in
courthouse hallways. 26 As aggrieved members of society, the victims
had little hope for compensation from either the "judgment proof" de-
fendants27 or from the state. Particularly during the past few decades,
while American courts were paying increased attention to the rights of
criminal defendants, little attention was paid to their victims. In re-
sponse to this state of affairs, "good citizens" have begun to clamor for
more protection.
The "victims' rights" movement has manifested itself in a diverse
array of grass roots organizations such as the Crime Victims Legal Ad-
vocacy Institute,28 Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, 29 and the Guardian
24 686 F.2d at 618.
25 See generaly Goldstein, Prosecution: Hito of the Public Prosecutor, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 1286 (S. Kadish ed. 1983); Goldstein, supra note 16, at 515-20; Note,
supra note 18, at 1171-73; Note, Compensating Victims of Crnmes: Evolving Concept or Dying Theos?,
82 W. VA. L. REv. 89, 90-91 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as Note, Compensating Victims].
26 See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 519-20 (noting that the victim is alienated from partici-
pation in the criminal prosecution because lack of guidance and communication by the prose-
cutor makes the victim feel uninvolved).
27 Most defendants are not in a financial position that would make obtaining a judgment
against them worthwhile. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 521-24; Laster, Criminal Restitution
A Suroq of Its Past Hitoy and an Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REv 71, 71-98
(1970); Turpen, The Cdminal Injustice System: An Overview of the Oklahoma Victims' Bill of Right,
17 TULSA L.J. 253, 253-59 (1981).
28 The Institute collects and disseminates information about various programs that assist
victims throughout the country. In addition, the group lobbies for the improvement of the
plight of the victim. For more information about the Institute, contact Frank Carrington,
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Angels. 30 In response to this movement, many governmental entities at
the federal, state, and local levels have enacted programs designed to
prepare victims and witnesses for the criminal process, to assist victims
in the post-crime adjustment period, and to financially aid victims of
crime. To date, twenty-eight states have promulgated some type of
"victim compensation" statute.3 ' Although the compensation programs
vary in administration, funding, eligibility requirements, and the
amount compensated, the programs basically offer financial assistance
to victims suffering post-crime economic hardship. Various governmen-
tal bodies also have implemented victim/witness programs to assist citi-
zens in their adjustment to courtroom experiences by familiarizing them
with criminal procedure, informing them of relevant occurrences in
Executive Director, The Crime Victims Legal Advocacy Institute, Inc., Suite 9, FSM Build-
ing, 210 Laskin Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia 23451.
The National Association for Crime Victims' Rights seeks, through a concerted national
effort, "to reverse the overconcern for criminals' rights at the expense of victims' rights." The
Association can be contacted at P.O. Box 16161, Portland, Oregon 97216.
29 MADD consists of the victims of drunk driving accidents and other concerned citizens
who voice their concerns about the drunk driving problem to legislatures, communities, and
business groups seeking to eradicate the drunk driving problem. In addition to lobbying for
legislative changes, the organization also monitors the decisions of various courts and operates
a Victim Outreach Program that aids victims by taking them through the court process step
by step. For further information, contact William A. VanDyke, Vice President, Mothers
Against Drunk Drivers, 5330 Primrose, Suite 146, Fair Oaks, California 95628.
:30 The Guardian Angels are a group of unarmed volunteers who combat crime in various
urban areas. After a three month period of physical and legal training, the red beret-clad
members patrol subways, buses, streets, ferries, and multiple dwellings in search of crime. For
further information, contact the Guardian Angels, C/o Curtis Sliwa, 982 East 89th Street,
Brooklyn, New York 11236.
31 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-.67.180 (1982); CAL. G v'T CODE §§ 13959-13974
(West Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-201 to -218 (West Supp. 1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9001-9017 (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 960.01 to .28 (West Supp. 1983);
HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-90 (1983); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-3.6-1 to .6-19 (Burns Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7301 to -7318
(1980); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 346.010 to .190 (1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, §§ 1-17 (Supp.
1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, §§ 1-17 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MICH. COMe,. LAWs
ANN. §§ 18.351-.368 (West Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. §§ 299.B.01-.B. 17 (1980); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 53-9-101 to -133 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1801 to -1841 (1981); NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 217.010 to .350 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-1 to :4B-21 (West Supp. 1983);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-13-01 to -13-20
(Supp. 1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.43, 2743.51 to .72 (Baldwin 1983); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 147.005 to .365 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 180-7 to -7.18 (Purdon Supp.
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-101 to -13-208 (1980); TEx. REv'. Civ. SrAT. ANN. art.
8309-1 (Vernon Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-368.1 to -368.18 (1981); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 7.68.010-.68.910 (1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 949.01-.18 (West 1981); see also GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-518 to -526 (1979) (compensation to person injured while preventing
crime); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25-1 to -25-14 (1981) (program enacted but not funded); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 34, §§ 151-177 (1978) (Virgin Islands compensation program); see generally
Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crine, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203 (1978); Comment, Rehabili-
tation of the Victims of Crime.- An Overview, 21 UCLA L. REv. 317 (1973); Note, Compensating
Victims, supra note 25.
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their cases, and offering counseling and protection.32 Several states now
require that victims be granted a "right of allocution" that allows them
to voice their views during the defendant's sentencing hearing.33 In ad-
dition, various states have passed so-called "Son-of-Sam" laws that pro-
hibit convicted felons from profiting from their crimes through the sale
of book or movie rights.34 In passing the Victim and Witness Prosecu-
tion Act of 1982, 35 the federal government adopted a number of the
aforementioned policies for establishing a more active role for the vic-
tims and witnesses in criminal prosecutions.
These developments illustrate the growing feeling that a criminal
prosecution must concern itself with more than simply the rights of the
criminal defendant. Because many other commentators have docu-
mented the rise of victims' rights legislation, 36 it is sufficient to note that
the Supreme Court's tilt toward the new model in criminal appeals has
been paralleled, and perhaps even prompted, by the enactments of the
various state legislatures and the proliferation of victim-oriented groups.
The cumulative effect is that the long-established principle that "a pri-
vate citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution...
of another" 37 is under fire.
III. THE NEW MODEL
Thus, Justice Stevens was quite correct in viewing Michl'gan v. Long
32 Seegenerallp VERA INST. OF JUST., FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND Dispo-
SITION IN NEW YORK CITY COURTS 135-40 (1977); T. WEIGEND, ASSISTING THE VICTIM
(Max Planck Inst. for Foreign & Int'l Crim. Law 1981).
33 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702F (Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1
(West 1982). The "right of allocution," that is, the right to address the court prior to sentenc-
ing, has traditionally been a right enjoyed only by defendants.
34 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1978);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3401 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1979); Criminal Victims' Escrow
Account Act § 3, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 403 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. § 346.165 (Supp.
1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 299B.17 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836 (1981); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a
(McKinney 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-59-40 to -59-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 16-18
(Vernon Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (Supp. 1983). For excellent studies
of the issues raised by "Son of Sam" statutes, see Comment, Compensating the Yict'mjrom the
Proceeds of the Criminals Stog--The Constitutionality of the New York Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 93 (1978); Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victins' Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54
IND. LJ. 443 (1979); Comment, In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches to the Problen of/he Ofenderar
Author, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1980).
35 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510 (1982). Pursuant to Section 6 of the Act, the Attorney
General promulgated guidelines for the Department of Justice. The Attorney General's
guidelines bear a great resemblance to the typical state victim programs. See Attorney General
Issues Guidelinesfor Victim, Witness Assistance, 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 1066 (Aug. 3,
1983).
36 See supra notes 16, 25, 27, 31-32, 34-35.
37 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619.
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as representative of a shift in the Court's traditional analysis of criminal
cases. 38 Long did not involve a situation in which the lower courts vio-
lated a defendant's federal constitutional rights; clearly, Long did not
need any help from the United States Supreme Court. Under the tradi-
tional model, the Michigan Supreme Court's liberal construction of
search and seizure law would have been of little concern to the Court
because Long, as representative of all Michigan citizens, emerged as a
"winner" in the balancing of individual rights against governmental
powers. If Long was not aggrieved, then no one else could possibly have
been injured.
The new model questions this assumption. It would find that the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Long caused Michigan's "good
citizens" to feel less secure knowing that now it would be more difficult
for the police to search for contraband. This model divides citizens into
two groups-those who are law-abiding and those who are criminal.
Lower court decisions that favor defendants do not redound to the bene-
fit of all citizens, as the traditional model of "individual versus the state"
intimated. Rather, the interests of the two groups are inversely re-
lated-gains for criminals result in losses for the law-abiding. In a case
such as Long, the Supreme Court continues its role as vindicator of fed-
eral rights; yet here the "rights" being vindicated are those of "law-abid-
ing citizens," and not of the defendant. Considered in this light, both
the Supreme Court's interest in Long and the concerns voiced in Justice
Stevens' dissent can best be understood.
IV. EVIDENCE OF THE NEW MODEL
The Court's opinion in Long, of course, makes no explicit mention
of this "good citizen/bad citizen" dichotomy. Yet evidence of the new
concern can be seen in several other aspects of the 1982 Term: first, by
the continued increase in the number of prosecution appeals in state
criminal cases being entertained by the Court; second, through several
other decisions, notably South Dakota v. Neville39 and California v. Ramos,40
in which Justice Stevens expressed sentiments similar to those that he
expressed in Long; and third, and most clearly, through a fascinating
series of comments made by Chief Justice Burger in three opinions deliv-
38 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3489-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 103
S. Ct. 3446 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983); Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct.
3100 (1983); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605
(1983); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983);
Connecticut v. Johnson, 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983);
Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983). In all these cases, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review state court decisions favorable to the individual defendant.
39 103 S. Ct. 916, 924 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3468 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ered during the ten weeks prior to the decisions in Michigan v. Long and
Califomia v. Ramos.
A. THE INCREASE OF PROSECUTION APPEALS FROM STATE COURT
CRIMINAL DECISIONS
The Court's interest in protecting "good citizens" from state court
decisions that favor "bad citizens" is reflected in the increasing number
of prosecution appeals in which certiorari is being granted.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Long succinctly described the recent dra-
matic increase of cases, both civil and criminal, in which the Court is
reviewing a request by a state to have its own judiciary reversed. Justice
Stevens noted that "[u]ntil recently we had virtually no interest in cases
of this type."'41 He went on to say that thirty years before, the Court
had reviewed only one such case.4 2 Fifteen years before, the Court had
reviewed no prosecution appeals, although it did deny three petitions for
certiorari.43 Justice Stevens opined that the Court's position shifted
around the time of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,44 and he
characterized the Court's recent docket as being "swollen with requests
by states to reverse judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of
their citizens."'45 Justice Stevens noted that the Court had heard argu-
ment in thirteen such cases during the 1982 Term, and at least eighty
such certiorari petitions had already been filed.46 Certainly the Long
decision will do nothing to decelerate the trend.
B. SOUTH DAKOTA P NEVILLE AND CALIFORNiA V' RAMOS
In a variety of cases decided earlier in the Term, Justice Stevens
criticized the Court's tendency to meddle in areas that were properly
under the control of state courts.47 On several occasions, he chastised
the Court for engaging in factfinding that properly belonged to state
courts4 8 and for erroneously finding federal questions lurking in state
41 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Nevada v. Stacher, 358 U.S. 907 (1953)).
43 103 S. Ct. at 3491 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The ZacchiniCourt held that the news media is not immune from
liability for invasion of privacy when it publishes a performer's entire act without that per-
former's permission to do so. Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that he would have remanded
the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for clarification concerning whether the holding rested
on a separate and adequate state ground. Id at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at n.3.
47 Justice Stevens expressed similar views in an article generally critical of the Court's
selection of cases. See Stevens, Some Thoughts onJudicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 180-81
(1982).
48 See Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. at 3330 n.* (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for engaging in a state-reserved factual determination as to whether a desk may
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court decisions. 49 In two of these cases, Justice Stevens took positions
against the majority similar to his stance in Long. Not surprisingly, they
also involved prosecution appeals in which, arguably, the Court chose to
protect "good citizens" despite the fact that traditional federal interests
were simply not at stake.
South Dakota v. Neville50 concerned a state statute providing that a
person suspected of driving while intoxicated could refuse to take a
blood-alcohol test, but emphasizing that such a refusal could be used as
evidence against him or her at a subsequent drunk-driving prosecution.
The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the introduction of such
evidence violated both the federal and state privileges against self-
incrimination. In a 7-2 decision with Justices Stevens and Marshall dis-
senting, the Supreme Court reversed, finding no violation of the fifth
amendment.
Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court had to explain
why the lower court's decision did not rest on independent and ade-
quate state grounds. The majority opinion held that although the
South Dakota Supreme Court's reference to its state constitution may
have provided an adequate state ground for its decision, its opinion did
not rest on an independent state ground.5 ' The Court stated, "Rather, we
think the [South Dakota] court determined that admission of this evi-
dence violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and then concluded without further analysis that the state
privilege was violated as well." 52
Finding that the South Dakota decision had indeed rested on an
independent and adequate state ground, Justice Stevens, in an opinion
joined by Justice Marshall, wrote, "If a state court judgment is premised
on an adequate state ground, that ground must be presumed independ-
ent unless the state court suggests otherwise. '53 He went on to argue
that the burden was on the petitioner to establish jurisdiction, and ob-
served that the Court's practice had been to dismiss cases as long as a
have contained contraband); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for attaching no weight to the factual determinations of the state
court that is better able to evaluate the facts); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1548 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (fact-bound inquiries not made by the Texas courts should not
be made by the Supreme Court).
49 See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S. Cit. 2979, 2984-85 (1983) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in the judgment) (although the Court had the power to hear case, it was
an unwise exercise of discretion); Connecticut v. Johnson, 103 S. Ct. at 978-79 & n.4 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (because a state is not required to apply the Chapman harmless
error test, no federal question arises if a state declines to apply the test).
50 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
51 Id. at 919 n.5.
52 Id.
53 Id at 925-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 75
THE BURGER COURT AND CRIMINAL REVIEW
state decision even "mzght have rested on an independent and adequate
state ground. '54 Justice Stevens asserted that "[u]nless we have explicit
notice that a provision of a State Constitution is intended to be a mere
shadow of the comparable provision in the Federal Constitution, it is
presumptuous-if not paternalistic-for this Court to make that as-
sumption on its own."-5
5
Faced with this conflicting view, why was the Court so anxious to
decide Neville and render what Justice Stevens cuttingly referred to as an
"advisory opinion"? 56 On the surface, Neville appeared to be a particu-
larly poor case in which to have granted a petition for certiorari. First,
as in Long, the defendant certainly had not been denied any federal con-
stitutional right by the South Dakota courts. Second, the South Dakota
Supreme Court's decision that the statute violated the right against self-
incrimination placed the court within a distinct minority ofjurisdictions
that had decided the issue;57 there was little danger that its arguably
improper view of the fifth amendment would extend much beyond the
Black Hills. 58 Third, it was particularly odd to doubt that the South
Dakota Constitution would not provide an independent and adequate
state ground. Seven years before, the United States Supreme Court in
South Dakota v. Opperman59 reversed the South Dakota Supreme Court
and found a police inventory search of a vehicle to be proper under the
fourth amendment. On remand, the South Dakota Supreme Court
found the search to be violative of its state constitution and noted: "We
have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitution
regardless of any similarity between the language of that document and
the federal constitution. " 60
Obviously, the Supreme Court must have felt there was more at
stake in Neville than merely correcting a decidedly minority view of the
fifth amendment. The Court's interest in vindicating the rights of the
law-abiding is suggested by the fact that the majority opinion's analysis,
written by Justice O'Connor, began not with a review of fifth amend-
ment principles, but rather with this introduction:
The situation underlying this case-that of the drunk driver-occurs
54 Id at 926 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
55 Id. at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 924 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 921.
58 Indeed, the mere fact that a decision conflicts with a ruling of the United States
Supreme Court is no guarantee that a petition for certiorari will be granted. For an interest-
ing discussion, see Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978) (White, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
59 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (approving concept of "inventory searches" at police stations).
60 State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). Seealso South Dakota v. Neville,
103 S. Ct. at 926 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Opperman).
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with tragic frequency on our Nation's highways. The carnage caused by
drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here.
This Court, although not having the daily contact with the problem that
the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("The increasing slaughter on our high-
ways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding
figures only heard of on the battlefield"); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401
(1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (deploring "traffic irresponsibility and
the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways"); Perez V. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 657 and 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The slaughter
on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars");
Machey v. Montiym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1979) (recognizing the "compelling
interest in highway safety").61
With Neville, and again later in the term in Illiois v. Baichelder,6" the
Court signaled its intention to join the fight of the "good citizens"
against drunk drivers even though federal interests as traditionally con-
ceived did not appear to be at stake.
It could be contended that the federal constitutional issues at stake
in Neville simply were not serious enough to merit a grant of certiorari.
Yet that perception pales when compared to the Court's decision to re-
view a California Supreme Court decision in California v. Ramos.6"3
Ramos involved yet another appeal by a state attorney general, ask-
ing the Supreme Court to reverse a criminal decision of the state's high-
est court. As in Long and Neville, the Supreme Court reversed the state
court in a majority opinion by Justice O'Connor, with Justice Stevens
filing a dissent."4
The issue in Ramos was the constitutionality of a jury instruction
given at the sentencing phase of capital cases in California. The jury's
choice at that point is to sentence the convicted murderer to death or to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 65 In 1978, the voters of
61 103 S. Ct. at 920.
62 103 S. Ct. 3513 (1983) (per curiam). The Court summarily reversed the Illinois Appel-
late Court and held that the United States Constitution did not require a police officer, in
enforcing an implied consent statute, to recite in an affidavit the specific and concrete matter
that led him to believe that a defendant was driving while intoxicated. The majority opinion
admitted that the Court decided the case summarily because of its concern that the decision
of the Illinois Appellate Court would have an adverse effect on the effort to halt the "car-
nage" on our nation's highways. Id. at 3516. In dissent, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Mar-
shall could find no reason why the case had to be decided without either briefing or oral
argument. Id. at 3517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
64 Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, and Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, were each decided on July 6, 1983.
65 The statute provides:
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard and
considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account
and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this sec-
tion, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines
[Vol. 75
1984] THE BURGER COURT AND CRIMINAL REVIEW 377
the State of California, through a statewide voter initiative that rein-
stated the death penalty, amended the California Penal Code to man-
date that a particular jury instruction be given in all death penalty
cases. 66 That instruction informed the jury that a sentence of life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole later could be commuted by the
governor to a sentence that included the possibility of parole.67 The
California Supreme Court subsequently found that this instruction,
commonly referred to as the "Briggs Instruction," violated the fifth,
eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
because it admitted irrelevant and arbitrary considerations to the death
sentence determination, and it failed to inform the jury of the governor's
power to likewise commute an imposition of the death penalty.68 The
United States Supreme Court granted the California attorney general's
petition for certiorari and reversed, finding no federal constitutional
violation.
Just why the Court accepted this case is not easy to fathom. It was
hardly a constitutional issue for which the states breathlessly awaited a
Supreme Court decision. Justice Marshall, in dissent,69 noted that
twenty-eight states other than California had considered the same issue.
Of those states, twenty-five had held the instruction to be improper. 70
On this point, moreover, even the majority opinion conceded that in
many of those jurisdictions, the decision appeared to be based not on
federal constitutional principles, but rather on state statutory grounds. 7'
Whether the Ramos decision will have substantial impact-indeed,
whether it will even change the final decision of the California
courts7 2-is a matter of considerable doubt.
This provides the background for Justice Stevens' argument that
certiorari never should have been granted in Ramos. Unlike his dissents
in Long and Neville, Stevens did not argue that the lower court opinion
was based on independent and adequate state grounds. Rather, he
that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of
fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1984).
66 Initiative measure approved on November 7, 1978.
67 The new amendment provided:
The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of confinement to state prison for
a term of life without the possibility of parole may in future after sentence is imposed, be
commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole by the Gover-
nor of the State of California.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1984).
68 People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982).
69 103 S. Ct. at 3460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 Id at 3466 & n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 3459 n.30.
72 The case currently is pending on remand to the California Supreme Court.
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questioned whether the granting of certiorari in this case represented "a
wise use of the Court's scarce resources, ' 73 asking:
Why, I ask with all due respect, did not the Justices who voted to
grant certiorari in this case allow the wisdom of state judges to prevail in
California, especially when they have taken a position consistent with
those of state judges in [twenty-five other states]?
I repeat, no rule of law commanded the Court to grant certiorari. No
other State would have been required to follow the California precedent if
it had been permitted to stand.
74
Ramos is yet another case in which no federal right of the criminal
defendant had been violated by the state courts. Moreover, there was
little likelihood that the California Supreme Court decision would have
much impact on other jurisdictions. Justice Stevens speculated that the
Court's only reason for hearing the case was to "facilitate the imposition
of the death penalty in California. ' 75 Certainly, the Court's decisions in
several 1982 Term death-penalty cases signaled that it would not stand
in the way of state decisions to impose the death penalty. 76 Yet, in all
other death cases this Term, the Court was afirming state decisions to
invoke the death penalty. In Ramos, the Supreme Court reversed a state
court's decision not to invoke it.
A plausible, though unarticulated, reason for the Court's interest in
Ramos may lie not so much with the substance of the jury instruction,
but rather with how the instruction had been promulgated. Use of the
"Briggs Instruction" had been approved by a statewide voter initiative
reinstituting the death penalty. Through the use of such an instruction,
the "good citizens" of California agreed to make it slightly easier to have
the death penalty imposed; their decision was frustrated when the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court voided the instruction based, in the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court, on a misinterpretation of federal consti-
tutional law. The real importance of Ramos may lie in its suggestion
that the United States Supreme Court will come to the aid of "good
citizens" whose efforts on behalf of "rational law enforcement" 77 are
73 103 S. Ct. at 3468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 3468-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 See Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (death penalty may be imposed even
though one of "aggravating circumstances" relied upon by trial judge was not one of those
included in state death penalty statute); Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) (no consti-
tutional barrier to admission of psychiatric testimony in a capital case concerning probability
of defendant's future dangerousness); Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983) (death penalty
may be imposed even though one of three "aggravating circumstances" found by jury was
later found to be unconstitutional); Alabama v. Evans, 103 S. Ct. 1736 (1983) (temporary stay
of execution vacated; "aggravating factors" of state statute were properly applied); see generally
Lauter, Justices Turn in a Lethal Scorecard in Dealing with Death Penalty Cases, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 1,
1983, at 3.
77 See Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100, 3102 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 75
1984] THE BURGER COURT AND CRIMINAL REVIEW 379
frustrated by misguided state courts.
Neville, Ramos, and Long would have been unlikely candidates for
the granting of certiorari under the traditional model, which was con-
cerned with whether the individual defendant's rights had been violated
by state courts and whether the issue involved was of crucial constitu-
tional significance. Supreme Court review of these cases is supported,
however, under the new model's concern with the rights of the law-abid-
ing-the "right" to strict drug enforcement, the "right" to curb drunk
drivers, the "right" to impose the death penalty. Moreover, this new
concern for the law-abiding has been articulated by the Chief Justice
himself.
C. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER AND THE NEW MODEL
Chief Justice Burger, who was responsible for assigning to Justice
O'Connor the majority opinions in Neville, Ramos, and Long,7 8 has per-
haps been the Court's most ardent spokesperson on behalf of the rights
of the law-abiding. He heralded this shift in focus through his com-
ments in three opinions filed during the 1982 Term.
In Morris v. Slappy,79 the Chief Justice authored a majority opinion
that disdainfully dismissed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the sixth
amendment required a "meaningful attorney-client relationship. ' 80
The Ninth Circuit had ordered that a third trial be held in a rape prose-
cution because the court found that defense counsel lacked adequate
trial preparation time, despite the fact that the defense counsel had told
the trial judge that he had been given sufficient time to prepare. In
reversing the order for a new trial, the Chief Justice made the following
comment:
In its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the [Ninth Cir-
cuit] wholly failed to take into account the interest of the victim of these crimes
in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case. Of course, inconven-
ience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce con-
stitutional rights of an accused; when prejudicial error is made that clearly
impairs a defendant's constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must
78 It is customary that when the Chief Justice is in the majority, he decides which Justice
will write the majority opinion. See B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 29-30 (1983).
79 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983).
80 The defendant in Slappy had been represented throughout pretrial proceedings by a
deputy public defender. Shortly before trial, the attorney was hospitalized for surgery. Six
days before the scheduled trial, a senior trial attorney from the public defender's office was
assigned to represent the defendant. After trial began, defendant moved for a continuance,
alleging that his attorney did not have time to adequately prepare the case. The attorney
denied this and trial resumed. Defendant's convictions eventually were reversed by the Ninth
Circuit, which held that the sixth amendment guaranteed a "meaningful attorney-client rela-
tionship" and that the denial of the continuance violated this right. See Slappy v. Morris, 649
F.2d 718, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1981).
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be borne by the prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution
permits nothing less. But in the administration of criminal justice, courts
may not ignore the concerns of victims. Apart from all other factors, such a
course would hardly encourage victims to report violations to the proper
authorities; this is especially so when the crime is one calling for public
testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience such as was in-
volved here. Precisely what weight should be given to the ordeal of reliving such an
experience for the third time need not be decided now, but that factor is not to be ignored
by the courts.8'
The Chief Justice cited no authority for this directive that the "con-
cerns of victims" be considered by courts. Consequently, Justice Bren-
nan, who concurred only in the result, noted in a footnote:
Although the Court acknowledges that "inconvenience and embar-
rassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce constitutional rights
of an accused,". . . it nonetheless appears to suggest that the interests of a
victim in a particular case should be considered by courts in determining
whether to enforce the established rights of a criminal defendant ...
Such a suggestion finds no support in our cases.8 2
A month later, the Chief Justice reprised his "victims' rights"
theme in Uniled States v. Hasting,8 "3 which reversed a decision of the Sev-
enth Circuit granting a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.
Finding that the Seventh Circuit had acted because it believed that it
possessed supervisory power to discipline prosecutors, regardless of
whether the prosecutorial conduct involved only harmless error, the
Chief Justice chastised the lower court:
It did not consider the trauma the victims of these particularly heinous
crimes would experience in a new trial, forcing them to relive harrowing
experiences now long past, or the practical problems of retrying these sensi-
tive issues more than four years after the events. 84
This time the Chief Justice cited to one authority for this proposition-
his own opinion in Morris v. Slappy. In dissent, Justice Brennan reiter-
ated that the interests of a victim in a particular case are irrelevant vis-
a-vis the enforcement of the rights of a criminal defendant.8 5
Several weeks later, the Chief Justice wrote a brief opinion concur-
ring in the Court's dismissal of Florida v. Casal.8 6 The opinion forms an
intriguing bridge between his own recent comments concerning victims'
rights and the decisions in Long and Ramos soon to follow.
Casal was yet another fourth amendment drug case that the Court
81 103 S. Ct. at 1617-18 (emphasis supplied).
82 Id. at 1625 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
83 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983).
84 Id. at 1979.
85 Id. at 1990 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983) (per curiam) (dismissal on ground that certiorari improvidently
granted).
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faced during the 1982 Term.8 7 Certiorari originally was granted to con-
sider whether a large quantity of marijuana had been improperly seized
from a vessel. 8 The Court subsequently dismissed the appeal, deter-
mining that the writ had been improvidently granted in that the decison
below rested on independent and adequate state grounds.
In his concurrence, the Chief Justice stated that he personally did
not believe that the seizure had run afoul of either the United States or
the Florida Constitution; nevertheless, he joined in the Court's decision
to dismiss because the Florida Supreme Court "apparently concluded"
that its own state law mandated suppression. The operative state laws
were Article I, § 12 of the Florida Constitution,8 9 a provision similar to
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, and a Florida
statute that requires consent or probable cause before a vessel can be
given a safety inspection.90
With regard to the Florida Constitution, the Chief Justice ap-
plauded the citizens of Florida for showing "acute awareness" 9' of the
general problem of inconsistency between state and federal constitu-
tions. They exhibited this awareness by recently amending Article I,
§ 12 to provide that it should be interpreted neither more nor less
broadly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the fourth
amendment. 92 The Chief Justice also noted that Floridians possess the
same power to amend the statute involved in the case, the provisions of
which forced the courts to suppress the marijuana that was recovered.
He then made a statement neatly placing the entire "good citizen/bad
citizen" concept into clear focus:
With our dual system of state and federal laws, administered by paral-
lel state and federal courts, different standards may arise in various areas.
But when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal
Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they
87 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319
(1983); United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605
(1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct.
1081 (1983).
88 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
89 FA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
90 FLA. STAT. § 371.58 (1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 327.56 (West Supp.
1983)) provides:
No officer shall board any vessel to make a safety inspection if the owner or operator
is not aboard. When the owner or operator is aboard, an officer may board a vessel with
consent or when he has probable cause or knowledge to believe that a violation of a
provision of this chapter has occurred or is occurring.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 327.56 (West Supp. 1983).
91 103 S. Ct. at 3101 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
92 Id. at 3101-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Because this amendment occurred after the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Casal, it had no effect on this case.
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have the power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement.93
In this brief comment, the Chief Justice articulates three points.
First, state courts, through constitutional and statutory interpretation,
have the right to "require more," i.e., provide more protection to de-
fendants, than the federal constitution requires. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court is powerless to prevent such action, resulting in a
state of affairs that the Chief Justice appears to view somewhat ruefully.
Second, law-abiding citizens might very well feel that such actions of
state courts inhibit "rational law enforcement," a view apparently
shared by the Chief Justice. Third, law-abiding citizens have the right
to "amend state law" to curb such state judicial activism.
Three weeks after Casal, the Supreme Court would decide Ramos
and Long. The Court's reasons for granting certiorari in these cases be-
come clearer in light of the Chief Justice's comments. Certainly, Justice
Stevens is correct that under traditional principles, the Court never
would have considered hearing either Ramos or Long. In both cases,
however, the Court was sending the same two messages to law-abiding
citizens that Chief Justice Burger communicated in Casal. First, Long
suggested to the law-abiding that the Court was prepared to view its
jurisdiction as broadly as possible in order to curb the excesses of those
state courts that "require more than the Federal Constitution" and thus
retard aggressive law enforcement. Second, Ramos additionally implied
that the Court would enthusiastically support the efforts of law-abiding
citizens "to amend state law" against a recalcitrant state judiciary, even
to the point of rendering decisions that ultimately may have no real
effect on any jurisdiction. 94
By the end of the 1982 Term, the Court had made it quite clear
that the concerns of crime victims and law-abiding citizens in general
were definitely a part of its decisionmaking process in criminal law. The
new model had definitely begun to take shape.
V. THE NEW MODEL'S EFFECT ON THE WINNERS AND LOSERS OF
THE 1982 TERM
At this point, one might contend that this new model is merely an-
other way of saying that the Supreme Court is "getting tough on crime"
or becoming more "anti-defendant." There are two responses to such an
interpretation.
First, the Court's interest in disciplining activist state courts has re-
sulted in the Court's accepting a different kind of criminal case. The
Court is far more willing to grant certiorari in criminal cases involving
93 Id. (Burger, CJ., concurring) (emphasis in original).
94 See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3459-60.
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defendants who have suffered no constitutional injury if the Court be-
lieves that the state courts have flouted the concerns of law-abiding
"good citizens." As previously shown, principles of judicial restraint
militated against granting certiorari in Neville, Ramos, and Long. Justice
Stevens, in the course of criticizing this tendency of the Burger Court,
has remarked: "A willingness to allow the decision of other courts to
stand until it is necessar
, 
to review them is not a characteristic of this
Court when it believes that error may have been committed." 95
Second, it is inaccurate to say merely that the Burger Court is
"anti-defendant"; in fact, the Court is hostile only to certain opes of
defendants. One can argue that during the 1982 Term, the Supreme
Court consistently ruled against only those defendants who were in situations
in which " ood citizens" would be unlikely to frnd themselves.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court ruled against the defendant
in every case involving a death row appeal. 96 Prisoners contesting both
inter-prison and intra-prison transfers received no help from the
Court.9 7 Restraints were tightened on habeas corpus petitions.98 The
Court made it significantly more difficult for the criminally insane ever
to be released from custody. 99 Convicted criminals attempting to ex-
punge prior convictions received two setbacks.t°° The Court refused to
95 Stevens, supra note 47, at 181 (emphasis in original).
96 See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983) (reversing state court finding of federal
constitutional violation in instructing jury that imposition of sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole could be commuted by governor to sentence allowing for parole);
Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (upholding state court decision even though it
relied upon aggravating circumstance that was not included in statute); Barefoot v. Estelle,
103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) (establishing new guidelines for processing death row appeals in fed-
eral courts); Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983) (upholding state court decision although
one of three aggravating circumstances found by jury was later found to be unconstitutional);
Alabama v. Evans, 103 S. Ct. 1735 (1983) (vacating district court's stay of execution); see
generaly Lauter, supra note 76; 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 4143 (Sept. 7, 1983).
97 See Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983) (neither fourteenth amendment nor
Hawaii Constitution granted a protected interest prohibiting interstate transfers of prisoners);
Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983) (prisoner can be administratively segregated from
general prison population); see generaly 33 CRIM. L REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 4159 (Sept. 21,
1983).
98 See Maggio v. Fulford, 103 S. Ct. 2261 (1983) (federal reviewing court cannot reassess
state court's factual determination of defendant's competency in order to grant habeas relief);
Cardwell v. Taylor, 103 S. Ct. 2015 (1983) (no habeas review on fourth amendment argument
that has been fully and fairly litigated); Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. 843 (1983) (state
court's factual finding must lack "fair support" in record before finding can be rejected by
federal court); Anderson v. Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276 (1983) (failure to fully present constitu-
tional claim below was fatal to habeas petition); see genera/'y 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 24,
at 4160 (Sept. 21, 1983).
99 See Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983) (person acquitted by reason of in-
sanity may be held until judged sane even though maximum sentence for original offense has
expired).
100 See Tuten v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1412 (1983) (sentencing court need not expunge
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invalidate any statements taken from "confessed" criminals. 0 1 Indigent
defendants preparing for trial were told that they had no right to what
the Ninth Circuit characterized as a "meaningful attorney-client rela-
tionship"; 0 2 the Court informed the same class of defendants that, if
convicted, they would have no right to insist that their appointed appel-
late counsel raise all non-frivolous issues.103 Indeed, to call attention to
the two major "victories" for criminal defendants during this Term-
that a person cannot be given life imprisonment with no possibility of
parole for a series of seven non-violent felonies 10 4 and that an indigent's
probation cannot be revoked simply because he currently cannot afford
to pay restitution 105 -seems almost Dickensian in its irony.
If the Court is interested in vindicating the interests of "good citi-
zens," one would expect it to have dealt with a large number of fourth
amendment cases, for there the issue is often whether admittedly "bad
citizens" should go free because of a violation of their rights. Indeed,
the Court reviewed a large number of fourth amendment cases; they all
involved illegal drugs10 6 and, almost without exception, the Court af-
firmed the convictions. 10 7 Furthermore, the Court was so anxious to de-
cide the "good faith exception" issue that it clumsily ordered
reargument in Illinois v. Gates solely on that issue, 10 8 and later "apolo-
gize[d]"' 10 9 to the parties for not reaching the issue because it had not
been raised below.1 0
Thus, with few exceptions, the Court found ways to rule against
"bad citizens" in criminal cases. This is not to suggest, however, that all
criminal defendants were given short shrift by the Court. For example,
record ofjuvenile); Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 103 S. Ct. 886 (1983) (post-probation
conviction expungement does not allow felon to carry firearms).
101 See California v. Beheler, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983) (interview of defendant by police in
station house five days prior to defendant's arrest did not require Miranda warnings); Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983) (defendant waived fifth amendment rights by initiating
conversation with police officer and submitting to polygraph after request for counsel); Wy-
rick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982) (Eighth Circuit improperly extended Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
102 See Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. at 1615, 1617.
103 See Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
104 See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
105 See Bearden v. Georgia, 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983).
106 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct.
2637 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
108 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982).
109 103 S. Ct. at 2321. In apology, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[w]e decide today, with
apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois
courts and, accordingly, do not address it." Id.
110 It appears that the Court is nevertheless intent on addressing the issue. See United
States v. Leon, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983)
(petition for certiorari in each case granted on June 27, 1983).
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in Flon'da v. Royer' l1 and United States v. Place,11 2 the Court announced
some restrictions on law enforcement officers in detaining people in air-
ports to investigate possible drug violations. In Kolender v. Lawson,' 13 the
Court found a California statute that required persons who loiter or
wander on the streets to provide "credible and reliable" identification
when stopped by the police to be void for vagueness. In United States v.
Grace,14 the Court protected the right of peaceful protest on the grounds
surrounding the Supreme Court building.
It does not require a Marxist scholar to point out that in these deci-
sions, the Court has come to the aid of the most middle class of inter-
ests-to paraphrase, the right of frequent flyers to be free from intrusive
luggage searches; the right of joggers not to carry wallets; and the right
of political action groups to peacefully picket the Supreme Court. The
fact is that the outcome of almost every criminal decision handed down
by the Court this past Term could have been correctly predicted by
simply asking whether there was any possibility that a law-abiding
"good citizen" could ever be in the defendant's position.1 15 The deci-
sions exhibit a reluctance to come to the aid of those citizens who most
need the Court's assistance-that is, the citizens with the least leverage
over decisions in the executive and legislative branches. In its rush to
111 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
112 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
113 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
114 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983).
115 But cf. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983) (upholding drug
conviction of yacht owner); Simopolous v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983) (upholding convic-
tion of doctor who performed abortion in an unlicensed facility during second trimester of
woman's pregnancy in violation of Virginia statute); South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916
(1983) (reversing state court finding that introduction of evidence of one's refusal to take
blood alcohol test violated privilege against self-incrimination). Although the cited decisions
do not seem to comport with the theory, close analysis reveals that the decisions may be
reconciled with the Court's interest in affirming the convictions of "bad people." In Neville
and Simopolous, the Court grapples with conflicting values. On one hand, the defendants are,
arguably, solid middle class citizens, not common "criminals." The defendants' transgres-
sions, however, invade areas that are now zealously guarded by the Court. The drunk driver
in Neville ran afoul of the grassroots movement that has mobilized against the "carnage
caused by drunk drivers." Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 920. See also Illinois v. Batchelder, 103 S. Ct.
3513 (1983). The protection ofour nation's children from drunk drivers prevailed. Similarly,
the doctor in Simopotlous violated a Virginia statute that required doctors to perform second
trimester abortions in a licensed facility. Although a doctor in good standing is an important
community asset, the doctor in Simofiolous violated a statute that protected "an 'important
and legitimate interest in the health of the mother' that becomes 'compelling. . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester.'" Simopolous, 103 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). Again, the Court in Sirmopolous chose to protect what it deemed to
be the greater middle class interest, i.e., safe abortions. Similarly, Villamonte-Marquez involved
another middle class concern-controlling drug traffic. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist assured
yacht owners that the customs agents' actions approved in the case would constitute only a
"limited" intrusion on their nautical activities. 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
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champion the rights of the "forgotten middle class," the Court is coming
perilously close to removing itself as the one forum in which truly forgot-
ten Americans occasionally have found relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's heightened interest in reviewing prosecution
appeals, as dramatically exemplified in Michigan v. Long, marks the
emergence of a new model of criminal appellate review. Whereas the
traditional model saw the Court as a protector of an individual defend-
ant's rights against unconstitutional state action, the new model installs
the Court as champion of the "rights" of good citizens in their fight
against lower court decisions favoring bad citizens. This interest in the
"rights" of the law-abiding has manifested itself in two discrete ways.
First, the court has been increasingly willing to ignore principles of judi-
cial restraint if selecting a particular case for review will serve to correct
a lower court's failure to consider adequately the rights of "good citi-
zens." Second, in its 1982 Term criminal decisions, the Court seemed
most reluctant to come to the aid of any defendant who sought constitu-
tional protection from a position in which no "good citizen" would ever
be found.
The "victims' rights movement" has been very effective in re-
minding the judiciary that the interests of victims, witnesses, and the
law-abiding have been overlooked for too long. Precisely how these con-
siderations should interface with the constitutional rights of defendants,
however, remains unclear.16 The Bill of Rights specifically guarantees
certain rights to citizens who are accused of criminal conduct; the
"rights" of the law-abiding to be protected from criminals are, on the
other hand, much more amorphous and arguably not based on the Con-
stitution at all. No court, especially the United States Supreme Court,
can allow a concern for victims, however well-intentioned, to become an
excuse for overlooking the specific constitutional rights that often hap-
pen to be guaranteed to "bad citizens." The Court must recall that its
decision in a particular case concerning even the "shabb[iest] '"1 7 of de-
fendants will define thereafter the rights that belong to all citizens. Jus-
tice Walter V. Schaefer once commented on the advantage of courts of
review in criminal cases: "The more remote the court, the easier it is to
consider the case in terms of a hypothetical defendant accused of crime,
instead of a particular man whose guilt has been established."' 18 The
116 SeeMorris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. at 1617-18.
117 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7 (1956).
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Supreme Court appears to have completely reversed this perspective
during the 1982 Term.
In closing, the Court would be well advised to recall Justice Frank-
furter's admonition thirty-four years ago: "The impact of a sordid little
case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to which the
case gives rise." t 19 In its rush to promote "rational law enforcement,"1 20
the Court cannot forget that constitutional rights belong to all citizens-
the "bad" as well as the "good."
119 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120 Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. at 3102 (Burger, Cj., concurring).
